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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLENE RAE TURNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
vs. Case No. 17257 
THOMAS DE LAN TURNER, 
Defendant and Respondent.: 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal by the Plaintiff-Appellant 
from a Ruling of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
in and for Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock presiding, denying Plaintiff-Appellant's 
Motion for New Trial and for Amendment of Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff-Appellant commenced this action in the 
lower Court to obtain a Decree of Divorce. Trial on the 
issues was held on the 21st day of May, 1980, and based 
thereon the Court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. The Decree 
granted a divorce to the plaintiff, provided for the 
division of the parties' property and debts, and for 
payment of alimony and attorney fees. The plaintiff 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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filed a Motion for a New Trial and for Amendment of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce. After submission of Memorandum and Argument 
the lower Court denied said Motion, prompting this 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks to have this Honorable 
Supreme Court affirm the Ruling of the lower Court 
denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial and for 
Amendment of Findings of Fact and Conclusiorn of Law 
and Decree of Divorce, and thereby affirming the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce entered by the Lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant-Respondent will follow the pattern 
of the Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief and the titles 
"Plaintiff" and "Defendant" will be used herein. 
The Defendant makes the following additions and correct· 
ions to the Plaintiff's Statement of Facts. 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were inter-married 
at San Leandro, California on June 26, 1971. The 
defendant brought assets into the marriage having a 
value in excess of $29, 000. 00, R-55, which assets inclut 
equity in a house in San Leandro, California, which thi' 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:t·' 
-3-
Defendant had purchased prior to the parties' marriage. The 
Plaintiff had a negative net worth at the time of marriage 
and brought no substantial assets into the marriage, T-36,37. 
Both parties had previously been married and the Plain-
tiff had a minor child which she brought into the marriage. 
The Defendant was the main support of the Plaintiff's 
minor child during the period of their marriage,T-40. The 
parties had no children as issue of their marriage. 
At the time of their marriage the IP-fendant was employed 
as a police officer by the Oakland City Police Department, 
and had worked sufficient years to retire, but he worked 
an additional year to vest pension rights in the Plaintiff, 
T-55. The Plaintiff was employed at the Bank of America 
at the time of their marriage, and continued to be employed 
there durin-g the peri6d of time the parties residea in 
California. 
It had been the Defendant's life long goal to move to 
Utah and own and operate a small farm, T-15,54. In further-
ance of that goal the parties entered into contracts of 
sale to purchase certain farm ground near Levan, Utah, 
beginning in 1974. In order that the parties could make 
the payments on the farm property and acquire the necessary 
farm machinery, the Defendant returned to his former trade 
l of iron worker. During 1975 and 1976, he worked as an iron 
·lu• 
i worker for Kaiser Steel, at times working seven days a week, 
;hf I 
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twelve hours a day, T-56,57. The Defendant during 1976 
and 1977 came to Utah by himself and worked on an iron 
work job at Kennecott Copper and lived in his truck camper 
in order to earn additional money for farm machinery, 
and on the weekends would come to Levan, Utah, to work 
on the farm, Dep. of Thomas Turner -72. 
In 1977, the Defendant sold his house in California and 
moved with the Plaintiff to Levan, Utah. The parties purch· 
ased what has been described as the Malmgren home in Levan, 
Utah, using the proceeds of the sale of the Defendant's 
house in California to purchase the house, R-54. The 
parties subsequently purchased what has been described as 
the Horton home in Levan, Utah, during 1978, and used the 
Malmgren home as a rental unit, R-53. 
After moving to Utah the Defendant began to operate the 
two farms the parties had previously purchased, with 
minimal help from the Plaintiff, T- 77-25. The two farms 
are generally described as the Christensen farm and the 
Bendixen farm, which farms total 48 acres with associated 
water stock. The farms at the time of divorce hearing had i 
I 
a total value by the defendant's testimony of $84,000.00 °1 1 
,·I At the time of the divorce the Defendant was 60 years o.c 
$1,750.00 an acre, R-51. 
and had various health problems which prevented him from i ) 
further employment as an iron worker, T-69. The Plaintl'· 
l Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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was 41 at Lhe time of the divorce, in good health, and 
employed as a receptionist at a medical clinic. 
The Court found trat the Plaintiff was entitled to a div-
orce from the Defendant on grounds of mental cruelty. 
The Defendant also presented testimony to establish 
grounds for his claim of mental cruelty as set forth 
in his Counterclaim, T-64,65,66. The Court made no 
finding that the Defendant had transferred his affections 
from the Plaintiff to another woman, and the Defendant had 
no involvement with another woman until after the Plaintiff 
had filed for divorce. 
The Plaintiff testified at trial that her monthly budget 
was $763.00, which amount included the $180.00 mortgage 
payment on the Horton home, and her projected increase 
after May, 1981, was as a result of a projected church 
mission or college expense by her son from a previous 
marriage, R-38. 
Both parties employed attorneys and incurred attorneys' 
fees, which they were obligated to pay, T- 87,88. 
After a full trial on the merits the Court awarded the 
Plaintiff the Horton home, a substantial portion of the 
parties household furniture and appliances, the parties 
car, and various other miscellaneous items. The Defendant 
was awarded the Malmgren home, the farms, the farm machinery, 
and various other miscellaneous items. The Defendant was 
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further ordered to make the monthly payments on the 
Horton home and pay the Plaintiff a $10,000.00 cash 
settlement. 
Using the values placed upon the property by the 
Defendant, and deleting the values of those items of 
property which the parties brought into the marriage and 
subtracting from the Defendant's total the $10,000.00 
he was ordered to pay the Plaintiff and the $20,000.00 
mortgage on the Horton home which he is obligated to I 
pay, the Plaintiff received a net distribution of $69,800.c:I 
and the Defendant received a net distribution of $95,688.0u; 
or 42% to the Plaintiff and 58% to the Defendant, R-58. 
Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter the Defendant executed and delivered to the 
Plaintiff a check for $10,000.00 with the endorsement on 
the back "Received as full payment of the $10,000.00 due 
and owing Shirlene Turner as part of the property settle-
ment in the Decree of Divorce between Shirlene Turner and 
Thomas D. Turner." The Plaintiff has accepted said check 
and cashed it. 
POINT I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION i 
IN DIVIDING THE MARITAL PROPERTY. 
This Court has stated on numerous occasions that ther: 
is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division 
of property, it is a prerogative of the trial court to mal1 
whatever disposition of property as it deems fair, equit· 
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able, and necessary for the protection and welfare of the 
parties. See Pearson v. Pearson, Utah, 561 p2d 1080 (1977) 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utah, 562 P2 d 235 (1977); Gramme 
v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P 2 d 144 (1978). 
Further this Court has also stated on numerous occas-
ions that the trial Court in a divorce action has consider-
able latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and 
property interests, and for the Plaintiff-Appellant to 
prevail, she would have to prove that there was a misunder-
standing or misapplication of law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly pre-
ponderated against the Courts findings, or that such a 
serious inequity resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. See Pope v. Pope, Utah, 589 P2 d 752 (1978) 
Hansen v. Hansen, Utah,537 P2 d 491 (1975). The Plaintiff 
has not sustained her burden of establishing one of the 
above mentioned factors that would warrant this Court in 
reversing the decision of the trial court as to property 
division. 
Using some of the factors set forth in McDonald v. 
McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P 2 d 1066 (1951) and stated 
in the Plaintiff's Brief, we obtain the following compar-
ison between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 
1. The defendant brought assets into the marriage having 
a value in excess of $29,000.00; the plaintiff had 
a negative net worth at the time of the marriage. 
2. The marriage between the parties had a duration 
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of nine years, and no children were born as issue 
of the marriage. 
3. The defendant supported the plaintiff's minor 
son from a previous marriage during the pa:iod of 
their marriage. 
4. Both parties worked during periods of the marr-
iage, with the defendant's income being substantially 
more than the plaintiffs. 
5. The defendant put forth extra effort to acquire 
the Utah farm property and machinery, working 
long hours and living under difficult conditions. 
6. At the time of the divorce the defendant was 
60 years old with health problems which prevented 
his normal employment; the plaintiff was 41 in 
good health, and employed as a receptionist at 
a medical clinic. 
7. The plaintiff's standard of living after the 
divorce will be basically the same as before the 
divorce; she is living in the same house with the 
same furnishings, and sufficient income to cover her 
monthly budget, and in addition she received $10,000.00 
as part of the property settlement. 
When reference is given to the above mentioned factors 
it becomes clear that the division of the property made 
by the lower Court herein permits the parties to pursue 
their lives in as happy and useful a manner as possible. 
Further the division of property by the lower Court 
will not likely lead to additional economic difficulties 
and distress, and therefore this Court should affirm the 
division of the property made by the lower Court. See 
Read v. Read, Utah, 594 P 2 d 871. (1979) 
The defendant received the farm and farm machinery, 
which had special significance to him because of his life 
long dream to operate a small farm in Utah and because 
of the extra sacrafice he had made to acquire those assets. 
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The plaintiff received the better of the two houses, 
free and clear of any obligation to pay the mortgage, 
and essentially all of the furnishings and appliances 
which the parties owned at the time of divorce. In 
addition she was awarded a $10,000.00 cash settlement 
from the defendant. After nine years of marriage, the 
plaintiff went from a financial position of having a 
negative net worth, to a position where she was awarded 
nearly $70,000.00 in assets. Clearly the lower Court 
did not abuse its discretion in distributing the parties 
assets in the manner that it did. 
POINT II. THE AWARD OF ALIMONY AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
AND NOT AN ARUSE OF DISCRETION 
This Court in recent cases has held that the purpose 
of alimony is to provide post-marital support, and it 
is not to be considered as a penalty to be imposed 
upon the husband, or as a reward granted to the wife. 
See Gramme v. Grarmne, Utah.587 P 2d 144, (1978). 
The criteria that should be used in determining 
a reasonable award of alimony include financial conditions 
and needs of wife, ability of wife to produce a suffi-
cient income for herself, and the ability of the husband 
to provide support, See English v. English, Utah, 565 
P2d 409, (1977). 
The plaintiff testified at trial that her monthly 
budget was $763.00, which amount included the $180.00 
monthly mortgage payment on the Horton home. She 
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further testified that she would need $225.00 a month 
alimony until she could adjust her affairs otherwise, 
based upon her then take-home pay of $540.00 per month, 
T-28. The trial Court ordered the defendant to pay 
the Plaintiff alimony of $50.00 a month for 24 months, 
and ordered him in addition to pay the $180.00 a month 
mortgage payment on the Horton home. The total monthly 
support payment ordered by the lower Court was $230.00, 
which exceeds the $225.00 requested by the Plaintiff. 
Clearly there was not an abuse of discretion in the 
award of alimony if it exceeded the actual request by 
the Plaintiff. 
Mention is made in the Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief 
that her monthly budget will increase in the future, 
because of the possible increased needs of her teenage 
son from a former marriage. The possibility of increased 
future needs is not a proper consideration in the deter-
mination of present support payments. The Plaintiff 
because of her present ability to work and earn an income, ' 
and because of her age and the condition of her health 
is in a much better position to provide for the future 
support of herself and her son, than is the defendant. 
As to the awarding of attorneys' fees, the Plaintiff 
alleges that the trial Court errored in awarding the 
Plaintiff only $500.00 attorney's fees rather than the 
J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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$1,540.00 that was requested. This Court has again 
held that the reasonableness of the award of attorneys 
fees is largely a matter within the discretion of the 
trial Court. See Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 U. ~ 12 P 2 d 
364 (1932) , Weiss v. Weiss, 111 U. 353, 179 P 2d 1005 
(1947). 
Many of the same factors used to determine if there 
was an abuse of discretion as to property division 
and as to award of alimony should be applicable, also, 
as to the award of attorney's fees. 
In assessing the need of the Plaintiff for the 
award of attorney's fees the Court should consider 
the fact that the Plaintiff made no request for tempor-
ary attorney's fees prior to trial; and was employed 
at the time of trial and the defendant was unemployed 
with his only source of income being the $930.00 a month 
pension check. The plaintiff was also awarded a 
$10,000.00 cash settlement which would provide a source 
for payment of attorney's fees. The defendant also had 
to employ an attorney to represent his interests, to 
whom he had to make payment. 
The Plaintiff implies in her Brief that the trial 
Court made a finding that $1,500.00 was a reasonable 
attorney's fee and the Court made an oversight in 
awarding only $500.00 on attorney's fees. In fact 
the Court only made a finding that the Plaintiff's 
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attorney expended 30 hours in prosecution of the 
suit and a reasonable fee per hour was $50.00 per 
hour. The award of $500.00 attorney's fees was not 
an oversight as the Court made a direct ruling on 
that amount when the Court denied the Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
Based upon the foregoing argument the lower Court 
did not abuse its discretion in the award of alimony 
and attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court at the close of the trial herein 
made the comment that in its view parties in a divorce 
action usually can made a better decision for them-
selves than the Court can, but when they force the 
Court to make those decisions, it can only base its 
decisions upon the facts as it sees them and the laws. 
Commenting further the Court stated that it obviously 
couldn't do what both parties wanted, but it would 
have to do what the evidence and the law indicates, T-88,81, 
The trial Court, because of its nature, is in the best 
position to evaluate the evidence and consider each 
of the parties' position and then render a sound decision. 
That is why this Court has consistently held in divorce 
cases that the trial Court has considerable latitude of 
J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~ 
I 
! 
-13-
discretion in adjusting the financial and property 
interests of the parties, and this Court will not 
reverse the decision of the trial Court unless there 
has been a substantial error or a serious inequity 
would result therefrom. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant has not met the burden 
of showing a substantial error or a serious inequity 
with respect to the division of property, or to the 
award of alimony and attorney's fees. The Plaintiff's 
standard of living will remain the same after the 
divorce as before; she will be living in the same house 
with the same furnishings, and will have sufficient 
income to cover her monthly expenses. In addition 
she was awarded a $10,000.00 cash settlement which 
she accepted as satisfaction of the property division 
between the parties. 
The award of the farm property to the Defendant 
is not an abuse of discretion, given the special signi-
ficance of that property to the Defendant and the signi-
ficant extra work and effort he put forth to obtain it. 
Based upon the facts herein and the argument setforth, 
clearly the division of property and the award of alimony 
and attorney's fees was within the latitude of discretion 
of the trial Court and its judgment should be affirmed 
by this Court. 
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Donald J. Eyre/ Jr/ V I 
125 North Main i 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Attorney for Defendant-
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